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Abstract: Th e topic of disinterested love became fashionable in 1697 due to 
the famous amour pur dispute between Fénelon (1651-1715) and Bossuet 
(1627-1704). It soon attracted the attention of Electress Sophie of Hanover 
(1630-1714) and she asked for an opinion about the dispute from her trusted 
friend and correspondent, the Hanoverian councilor Gottfried Wilhelm Leib-
niz (1646-1716). Th is gave Leibniz an opportunity to present his views on the 
matter, which he had developed earlier in his career (for example, in Elementa 
juris naturalis of 1671 and Codex iuris gentium of 1693). In his 1697 letter to 
Sophie he did not explicitly take sides in the dispute, but formulated his own 
views on the topic in a theological manner, aiming to provide an account of 
disinterested love which would surpass the doctrines of both French theolo-
gians. In addition to presenting Leibniz’ early views on disinterested love and 
examining this alternative formulation of his views on love, I will show that 
after the letter Leibniz gave this alternative perspective up and returned to his 
earlier, more philosophical views on the topic, which suggests that he regarded 
them to be superior to the theological version, where the virtue of charity was 
related to the virtue of hope.  
Keywords: Leibniz, Electress Sophie of Hanover, pure love controversy, Fé-
nelon, Bossuet, love, hope, charity.
1. Introduction
Th e topic of disinterested love became fashionable in 1697 due to the 
famous amour pur dispute between Fénelon (1651-1715) and Bossuet (1627-
1704). It soon attracted the attention of Electress Sophie of Hanover (1630-
1714) and she asked for an opinion about the dispute from her trusted friend 
and correspondent, the Hanoverian councilor Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
(1646-1716). Th is was good news for Leibniz, as he not only had an interest 
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in the dispute, but also had his own views on the topic. However, there is no 
evidence that she ever answered Leibniz’ lengthy letter. 
Although the discussion perhaps went no further, Leibniz’ letter is intrigu-
ing and deserves attention because it places his earlier views on disinterested 
love in the context of the heated theological controversy and shows how Leib-
niz applied his jurisprudential-ethical doctrine to a theological framework. 
His purpose seems to have been to persuade Sophie of the superiority of his 
doctrine compared to the views of the French theologians. Th e letter remains 
the only occasion when Leibniz was prepared to modify his doctrine of disin-
terested love, published in his 1693 Codex iuris gentium. 
I will present Leibniz’ doctrine of disinterested love and discuss a few recent 
interpretations of its coherence, discuss the letter to Sophie and show how Leib-
niz modifi ed his doctrine to place it in the context of the pure love controversy. I 
will also show that he returned to his earlier, more philosophical formulations of 
love after the letter to Sophie, arguing that the theologians participating in the 
controversy should have followed his doctrine, which off ers an optimal solution 
to the central problem of our motivation concerning salvation. 
2. Disinterested Love: Egoism or Altruism?
Leibniz’ mature published writing on disinterested love is the Preface to 
the Codex iuris gentium (1693), which is a large collection of medieval docu-
ments supporting the position of the Holy German Roman Empire against 
French claims. In the Preface Leibniz praises universal benevolence, which is the habit 
of loving or willing the good of another: 
Love then signifi es rejoicing in the happiness of another, or, what is the same thing, 
converting the happiness of another into one’s own. With this is resolved a diffi  cult 
question, of great moment in theology as well: in what way disinterested love is 
possible, independent of hope, of fear, and of regard for any question of utility. In 
truth, the happiness of those whose happiness pleases us turns into our own hap-
piness, since things which please us are desired for their own sake.1
Disinterested or pure love is joy or pleasure in another person’s well-being. 
According to Patrick Riley, there is a necessary connection between our prac-
ticing disinterested love and God’s love for his creation, the best of all pos-
sible worlds. As God is the source of the actual world we live in, refl ecting 
his perfections is the greatest and most durable pleasure there can be because 
1 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Political Writings, trans. and ed. with and introduction and 
notes by Patrick Riley, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 (hence-
forth R), p. 171; Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Die Werke, ed. by Onno Klopp, Hanover: 
Klindworth, 1864-84 (henceforth K), I, 6, p. 470. 
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God represents infi nity and the greatest perfection. Loving other people is a 
consequence of loving God as we are made in his image. Although many for-
mulations of the doctrine of disinterested love are related to a long tradition 
of Christian thinkers (especially the Gospel of St. John), Leibniz discusses it 
in the context of justice, which he consistently defi ned as the charity of the 
wise (caritas sapientis).2
However, he argues that his doctrine can be used in a theological context, 
too: with it one can resolve the diffi  cult question of love independently of 
hope and fear and any question of utility. Leibniz modifi es Roman law to fi t 
this idea by converting the highest degree of “live honestly” to “live piously” 
or charitably.3
In this way Leibniz’ doctrine strives to reconcile the competing motiva-
tions of egoism and altruism. Wise and virtuous men act analogously to God, 
who loves his creation disinterestedly. In Méditation sur la notion commune de 
la justice (1702-1703?) Leibniz argues that God and men have essentially the 
same motivation to promote perfection and because of that, men’s supreme 
function is to imitate divinity within the limits of human nature.4
Th e two apparently confl icting motivations of one’s own good and the 
good of others are necessarily tied to each other. Th e fullest discussion of the 
motivational grounding of Leibniz’ doctrine is found in his fi rst substantial 
account of disinterested love, an unpublished memoir titled Elementa juris 
naturalis (1670-1671); I will refer here to the most complete version of it, 124 
(A VI, 1, pp. 459-465). Leibniz argues that “the sciences of the just and the 
useful, that is, of the public good and of their own private good, are mutually 
tied up in each other.”5 However, the right reason for our actions is identifi ed 
with prudence. He says: 
Prudence […] cannot be separated from our own good, and any statement 
which contradicts this is empty and foreign to the actual practice of those who 
utter it, whatever they may say against it. Th ere is no one who deliberately 
does anything except for the sake of his own good, for we seek the good also of 
those whom we love for the sake of the pleasure which we ourselves get from 
their happiness.6
2 Patrick Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence: Justice as the Charity of the Wise, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 141-144.
3 Ibid., p. 199. 
4 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Rechtsphilosophisches aus Leibnizens Ungedruckten 
Schriften, ed. by Georg Mollat, Leipzig: Robolsky, 1885 (henceforth M), p. 72.
5 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. and ed. with an 
introduction by Leroy E. Loemker, 2nd edition, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976 (henceforth L), p. 
132; Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Berlin: Akademie, 1923- 
(henceforth A), VI, 1, p. 460. 
6 L, p. 134; A VI, 1, p. 461. 
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Here Leibniz states quite clearly that the primary motivation is our own 
good, and our motivation to wish for the happiness of other people is to gain 
pleasure from their happiness. Th erefore there seems to be only one moti-
vation, prudence. Th is view is problematic, however: if our primary motive 
would be a reward for helping others, we would not care to do that if no re-
ward is promised.7 Because of this Leibniz provides a new way of understand-
ing how to reconcile egoistic and altruistic motivations: 
Th ere is a twofold reason for desiring the good of others; one is for our own good, 
the other as if for our own good. Th e former is calculating, the latter loving. Th e 
former is the aff ection of a master for his servant, the latter that of a father for his 
son […] the former for the sake of some other expected good, the latter for its own 
sake. But, you ask, how is it possible that the good of others should be the same as 
our own and yet sought for its own sake? For otherwise the good of others can be 
our own good only as means, not as end. I reply on the contrary that it is also an 
end, something sought for its own sake, when it is pleasant.8
Leibniz is saying here that that which is pleasant is sought for its own sake 
and that there are two reasons to help others, of which one is directly for our 
own good (the calculating motivation) and another indirectly for our own 
good, which is properly love (the altruistic motivation).
In a recent paper Noa Naaman Zauderer has suggested that we can act 
on both motivations at the same time. Th e pleasure sought for its own sake 
is greater than the one that is sought for mercenary or calculating motives, 
as another’s pleasure increases or builds upon our own pleasure. Th e pleasure 
of the other is expressed or mirrored and in this way it intensifi es our own 
pleasure. According to Naaman Zauderer, we can have both the objective of 
helping others and our own good simultaneously in mind as ends. If our mo-
tivation is mercenary, the pleasure gained is smaller than from what follows 
from acting according to disinterested motivation. Th us one must take the 
other’s welfare to be also a means for one’s own benefi t, bringing together the 
two motivations. However, if a just man acts on both these motivations, one 
is likely to be the consequence of the other, and one is not necessarily aware 
of both motivations at the same time. Th us Naaman Zauderer interprets the 
phrase as if in the passage as referring to non-conscious motivation, arguing 
that while we may consciously desire to benefi t others, our underlying uncon-
scious motive may be egoistic.9
7 A VI, 1, pp. 462-463. 
8 L, p. 136; A VI, 1, p. 463.
9 Noa Naaman-Zauderer, “Rethinking Leibniz’ Notions of Justice, Love and Human 
Motives,” in Herbert Breger, Jürgen Herbst und Sven Erdner (eds.), Einheit in der Viel-
heit. VIII. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Vorträge 2, Hannover: Gottfried-Wilhelm-
Geschellschaft, 2006, pp. 671-676, at pp. 672-674. 
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Th is is a fresh approach, but it faces the diffi  culty that Leibniz does not 
mention unconscious motivations. He seemingly fi rst wrote on unconscious 
perceptions in his Meditationes de cognitatione, veritate et ideis in 1684, over 
ten years after the Elementa. Th erefore it seems to me that with respect to 
Leibniz’ original doctrine of disinterested love in the Elementa, there are only 
conscious, known motivations.10
In response to Naaman Zauderer, Gregory Brown presents a novel inter-
pretation of the key passage above. According to Brown, there is only one 
motivation, namely our pleasure. Th e principal reason for the confusion in 
Leibniz scholarship concerning Leibniz’ views is the widely used translation 
by Loemker, which in this passage is seriously misleading. As Brown persua-
sively shows, the passage  should be interpreted to mean that to desire the 
good of others propter nostrum bonum (for the sake of our own good)  is to 
desire it, not as an immediate source of pleasure in itself, but rather as a means 
of obtaining something else that is an immediate source of pleasure.11 Th us, if 
I help a woman in trouble propter nostrum bonum, my pleasure does not come 
directly from her happiness, but indirectly from somewhere else, such as a 
reward I hope to receive. I do not really love her, but my own good. Th erefore, 
the pleasure is not gained as a direct consequence of helping another person.  
On the other hand, if we desire something quasi nostrum bonum (as if it 
were our own good), this is to desire it because it is an immediate source of 
our pleasure, i.e., because we fi nd our pleasure immediately in the perception 
of this good (without any reward). In this case our desire for our own good is 
what moves us to desire the good of those whom we love. Th e other is not a 
means as in the fi rst case, but an end, and this is properly disinterested love. 
In other words, we fi nd ourselves pleased to desire the good of the loved one. 
Accordingly, while in the fi rst case the good is a consequence of our good 
deed, in the latter case the good of those whom we love disinterestedly is con-
stitutive of our own good and there is no confl ict between the two motives.12
10 There is no mention of unconscious motivations in the 1693 Codex either. 
Also, in Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (NE, 1704) Leibniz does not say a 
word about unconscious motivations in the relevant passage of II, xx, §6, despite the fact 
that in the next paragraph he goes on to discuss disquiet, which is constituted by minute, 
insensible perceptions. In addition, he argues in II, xxi, §5 that we are always aware of our 
volitions. A decision to help the other person is clearly founded on a volition, although in 
the same work Leibniz also discusses the instinct of sociability (NE I, ii, §9). This instinct 
in itself, however, is only an appetition which inclines us towards other people. A genuine 
volition to help others requires conscious actions.
11 Gregory Brown, “Disinterested Love: Understanding Leibniz’ Reconciliation 
of Self- and Other-Regarding Motives,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 
19 (2011), pp. 265-303, at pp. 274-275.
12 Gregory Brown, “Leibniz’ Moral Philosophy,” in Brandon C. Look (ed.), Continuum 
Companion to Leibniz, London: Continuum, 2011, pp. 228 and 230; Brown, “Disinter-
ested Love,” p. 277.
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Th e noteworthy thing about Brown’s interpretation is that, whereas Leib-
niz’ account has been usually seen as reconciling egoistic and altruistic mo-
tivations, in his account both cases are based on our egoistic motivations. 
Th us there are not two ends we strive for at the same time, but only one end, 
our pleasure. Brown admits that if one defi nes altruistic actions as those that 
are motivated by a desire for the good of others without any concern for the 
agent’s own good, Leibniz’ theory simply does not accommodate this moti-
vation.13 Judging by the Elementa, this actually seems to be the case—Leibniz 
is explicit that we cannot escape our prudential motivation. However, when 
our striving is put to good use, that is, to promoting the good of others, it is 
virtuous. To my mind, Brown’s approach and his interpretation of the key pas-
sage presented above is the most accurate account available. My subsequent 
examination of Leibniz’ letter to Sophie is also in line with it. 
Bearing this in mind, we can turn to the details of how another’s well-
being aff ects us. According to Naaman Zauderer, pleasure is multiplied, inten-
sifying or adding to our own pleasure when we love the other disinterestedly. 
She argues that Leibniz’ statement that fi nding pleasure in another person’s 
well-being does not rule out the possibility that we also fi nd a certain amount 
of pleasure when we seek our own good.14 Following Brown, we can say that 
the pleasure following from mercenary motivation comes from my own good, 
not from the good of the other. So it has another source than the immediate 
pleasure following from disinterested love. In the Codex Leibniz argues that 
by loving the other disinterestedly, that person’s happiness is converted to 
our happiness.15 Th ere is no mention of increase of pleasure—rather, Leibniz 
seems to be saying that the other’s happiness produces our happiness. Th is 
would suggest that the other’s pleasure is diff erent in kind to our own plea-
sure, as it has to be converted. Th is would seem to be a counter-argument to 
Naaman Zauderer’s interpretation that there can be two motivations (founded 
on pleasure) present in the mind at the same time. However, Leibniz does 
seem to argue for the doubling of pleasure in the Elementa: 
Pleasure, however, is doubled by refl ection, whenever we contemplate the 
beauty within ourselves which our conscience makes, not to speak of our vir-
tue […] For every mind is something like a mirror, and one mirror is in our 
mind, another in the mind of someone else. So if there are many mirrors, 
that is, many minds recognizing our good, there will be a greater light, the 
mirrors blending the light not only in the eye but also among each other. Th e 
gathered splendour constitutes glory.16
13 According to Brown, Leibniz was committed to some form of psychological egoism, 
perhaps a form of mitigated egoism: Brown, “Disinterested Love,” pp. 266 and 282-285.
14 Noa Naaman-Zauderer, “Rethinking Leibniz’ Notions of Justice, Love and Human 
Motives,” p. 672.
15 K, I, 6, p. 470.
16 L, p. 137; A VI, 1, p. 464.
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To my mind, in this passage Leibniz is arguing that pleasure is multi-
plied in us when we refl ect our virtue and its cause is our own goodness. Th e 
more other minds recognize our perfection, the greater the increase of gen-
eral perfection and beauty in the world. Th is recognition, however, is founded 
on immediate pleasure which follows from disinterested love—a little ear-
lier Leibniz defi ned beauty as contemplation of that which is pleasant.17
In Nouveaux essais Leibniz argues that joy is a state where (intellectual) pleasure 
predominates over displeasure in us.18 Th e two kinds of pleasure from diff erent 
motivations cannot be combined and Leibniz is clear in recommending the plea-
sure derived from perfection rather than the pleasure derived from the senses.19 
In the Elementa Leibniz in fact argues that the good of others may sometimes 
require us to suff er: “Justice will be the habit of deriving pleasure from an 
expectation of the good of others, even to the expectation of our own pain.”20
Happiness is a process which requires a continuous state of virtue and wis-
dom, giving us a readiness to feel joy from perceiving perfection.21 Th is must 
be what Leibniz refers to in the Elementa when he is discussing beauty within 
ourselves. In the Codex Leibniz expresses the same ideal as follows: “By moral 
I mean that which is equivalent to ‘natural’ for a good man […] a good man 
is one who loves everybody, in so far as reason permits.”22
It is not clear what this “natural” is, but it seems to me that he is thinking 
of man as a created being and therefore the virtue or beauty of man is founded 
on our innate dispositions (for example, pleasure as striving for perfection).23 
Another passage in the Codex would seem to support this: “Since God pos-
sesses supreme power and supreme wisdom, his happiness does not simply 
become ours (if we are wise, that is, if we love him), but even creates ours.”24 
Love of created beings can give us some pleasure, but God alone can create all 
our happiness.25
Brown argues along similar lines, saying that perfection of the mind is 
constitutive of the happiness of persons. However, he does not discuss innate 
17 Ibid.
18 NE II, xx, §7; A VI, 6, p. 166.
19 See, for example, La Félicité, in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Textes Inédits d’après les 
manuscrits de la Bibliothèque provinciale de Hanovre, publiés et annotés par Gaston Grua, 
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948 (henceforth G), p. 579. See also Principles of 
Nature and Grace, §16, in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften, ed. 
by G. I. Gerhardt, Hildesheim: Olms, 1961 (henceforth GP), VI, p. 605.
20 L, p. 137; A VI, 1, p. 465. 
21 See Leibniz’ letter to Ernst August, A I, 4, p. 315.
22 R, p. 171; K, I, 6, pp. 469-470.
23 Beauty of a person is discussed in more detail in a letter to Arnauld in 1671 where 
Leibniz defi ned it as an optimum between wisdom and power. A II, I, p. 174. Of innate 
dispositions, see NE, Preface, A VI, 6, pp. 48-52. 
24 R, p. 171; K, I, 6, p. 470.
25 Leibniz to Nicaise, GP II, p. 578.
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dispositions, saying only that the perfections of God are transferred to happy 
persons. To my mind, however, Leibniz can be interpreted as saying that be-
cause we have an inner disposition towards God, we strive to imitate him and 
when we succeed in this task, we perceive perfection. Th is happens when we 
practice disinterested love.26 In other words, disinterested love is related to 
action, as pleasure is an appetite towards perfection.27 Another way of un-
derstanding “natural” is to see it as prudential moral philosophy where we 
strive to be charitable to others, but do not ignore our own interests. Th us 
it is simply practicing disinterested love as Leibniz defi nes it in the Elementa 
juris naturalis.28
Finally, I will briefl y discuss an opposite case of our pleasure which Brown 
does not mention. Leibniz wrote to Arnauld in 1671 that the unhappiness of 
others produces pain in us.29 I think this shows that Leibniz’ doctrine works 
the other way around, too. Unhappiness found in the loved one introduces 
an immediate displeasure in us, refl ecting universal imperfection. It would 
seem (in the interpretation I have supported) that if our motivation to love 
the other were mercenary, the unhappiness of the other would not really aff ect 
us, as our source of pleasure would come from somewhere else. Th us it is only 
the unhappiness of those we love disinterestedly that produces pain in us. It 
seems to me to be clear, however, that mercenary motives will eventually bring 
us indirect pain as the pleasure following from self-interested motivation is 
temporary and can introduce a greater pain, unlike disinterested love, which 
produces a lasting pleasure.   
We have seen that Leibniz’ doctrine of disinterested love had an early ori-
gin in his writings and reached maturity in his 1693 publication Codex iuris 
gentium. While the doctrine of disinterested love is related to a long tradition 
of Christian writers, Leibniz usually discusses the doctrine in a philosophical 
or jurisprudential rather than a theological context. His premise in the Codex 
about the suitability of the doctrine to theological problems was put to the 
test in the late 1690s. 
26 Brown, “Disinterested Love,” pp. 292-303.
27 NE II, xxi, §72; A VI, 6, p. 210.
28 This reading is presented in Ursula Goldenbaum, “It’s Love! Leibniz’s Foundation of 
Natural Law as the Outcome of His Struggle with Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s Naturalism,” in 
Mark Kulstad, Mogens Lærke and David Snyder (eds.), The Philosophy of the Young Leib-
niz, Stuttgart: Steiner, 2009, pp. 189-201. However, I disagree with Goldenbaum (p. 196) 
on the point that the natural moral philosophy promoted by Hobbes would in Leibniz’ case 
rule out any kind of innate principle of sociability. He clearly maintains this in Nouveaux 
essais I, ii, 9 (A VI, 6, 93). For Leibniz, both prudence and instinct for affection towards the 
members of our own species lead us to disinterested love.
29 A VI, 1, p. 280.
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3. Th e Controversy of Pure Love 
Th e so-called amour pur controversy emerged in France in 1697 between 
two famous clerics and royal tutors, François Fénelon and Jacques-Bénigne 
Bossuet.30 Th e controversy was the result of diff erent reactions to the views 
of the famous mystic and proponent of quietism, Mme Guyon (1648-1717). 
Her views were creating doubts in the court, especially in the mind of the 
unoffi  cial wife of Louis XIV, Mme de Maintenon, and Bossuet was a member 
of a committee which offi  cially condemned her views in 1695.31 In the back-
ground there was also Nicolas Malebranche’s (1638-1715) analysis of love, 
especially in Traité de morale (1684).32
Fascinated by Mme Guyon’s ideas,33 Fénelon published his book Explication 
des maximes des saints sur la vie intérieure in January 1697, where he argued that 
true love of God (charity) must be disinterested or completely free of self-interest 
even in the sense that the soul does not care about its own salvation. In perfect 
love of God one would lose oneself completely and desire nothing for its own sake 
except that God’s will be done. Th is state of pure love is thus one of indiff erence 
with respect to salvation. In contrast, concupiscent love is subject to fear and hope 
(concerning life after death), which would be mercenary motives: the concupis-
cent lover himself, rather than God, is the ultimate end of this love.34
Bossuet answered his former protégé’s views six weeks later in his Instruc-
tions sur les états d’oraison, in which he argued that the true love of God was 
30 For a detailed account of the controversy, see Gabriel Joppin, Fénelon et la mystique 
du pur amour, Paris: Beauchesne, 1938.
31 On Mme Guyon and pure love, see Nancy C. James, The Confl ict over the Heresy 
of “Pure Love” in Seventeenth-Century France: The Tumult over the Mysticism of Madame 
Guyon, Lewinston: Mellen, 2008.
32 Malebranche defi nes virtue as a dominant and stable habit of loving all there is in ac-
cordance with God’s order. Loving is motivated by either light of the mind or by pleasure 
and our task as moral agents is to make loving God’s order habitual. In this way we become 
one with God. Of special interest in the Treatise is chap. 8, sec. XV, which Malebranche 
added to the work in 1697 in order to distance himself from quietism, to which he was often 
associated. There he says: “Take away from the mind all self-love, all desire to be happy 
and perfect; let nothing be pleasing to it, the perfections no longer affecting it, and here 
doubtless you will have a person incapable of any love. If nothing can be pleasing to a per-
son, how can he be pleased with God?” (Nicolas Malebranche, Treatise on Ethics (1684), 
trans. with an introduction by Craig Walton, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992, pp. 10-11, 105.) In 
1699 he publicly rejected the claim by François Lamy that the Traité de morale supports the 
quietist position. See Tad Schmaltz, “Nicolas Malebranche,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), [accessed on 23 July 2013] 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/malebranche/. 
33 For the correspondence between Fénelon and Mme de Guyon, see Pierre-Maurice 
Masson, F énelon & Mme Guyon: documents nouveaux et inédits, Paris: Hachette, 1907.
34 Robert Merrihew Adams, “Pure Love,” Journal of Religious Studies 8 (1980), pp. 
83-99, at pp. 83-85.
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and could only be motivated by one’s desire for personal happiness.35 One is 
always motivated by one’s own salvation and therefore the pure love of God is 
not indiff erent.36 Desiring an eternal happiness and hoping for beatitude sig-
nifi es in fact being in union with God—it is not obeying a selfi sh or egoistic 
law; it is acting in a way which corresponds to the way God has created us. 
Pure love is thus adoration of God which brings with itself a reward. Bossuet 
saw Fénelon’s doctrine of pure love as the defi ance of rational, logical Christi-
anity.37 Fénelon, on the other hand, saw pure love as a perfection which is not 
open to all. It is through God’s grace that one can progressively achieve that 
desired mystic union, and no intervention, expect His, is possible.38
Th e debate became increasingly heated and led to a war of letters and 
pamphlets before it was fi nally stopped by the condemnation of Fénelon’s 
book by Pope Innocentius XII on 12th of March 1699.39 Bossuet emerged as 
a winner in the three-year battle and Fénelon had to retire from court to the 
Archbishopric of Cambrai.
It is noteworthy that the controversy was of special interest to several 
learned women of the time. Most importantly, Madame Guyon was the insti-
gator of the debate and the principal exponent of the quietist or semi-quietist 
cause in late seventeenth-century France. She argued that one can reach per-
fection internally within a short time by means of prayer and therefore the 
self should be suppressed, letting the Almighty take presence in us. Her views 
were criticized by many, especially Bossuet, as imaginary and mystical.40
In England, Mary Astell (1666-1731) was of a similar opinion to Madame 
Guyon and discussed the topic with the Platonist John Norris (1657-1711) in 
eleven long letters. Th eir correspondence was published in London in 1695 
under the title Letters Concerning the Love of God, before the controversy in 
France broke out. Astell’s approach to visionary metaphysics was attacked by 
yet another learned woman of the time, Damaris Masham (1658-1708), a close 
friend of John Locke’s and later a correspondent of Leibniz’. She regarded As-
tell’s views as religious enthusiasm and published a more empirically-minded 
35 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Leibniz and the Two Sophies: The Philosophical Corre-
spondence, ed. and trans. by Lloyd Strickland, Toronto: Iter, 2011 (henceforth LTS), p. 174.
36 According to Bossuet, this kind of indifference would exclude not only the hope of 
salvation, but also fear of justifi ed punishment, which would subvert Christianity. See Pat-
rick Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence, p. 142.
37 James Herbert Davis, Fénelon, Boston: Twayne, 1979, p. 86. For details concerning 
hope in the controversy, see Gabriel Joppin, Fénelon et la mystique du pur amour, chaps. 
2-3. Bossuet’s view is close to Malebranche’s view of 1697, see footnote 31.
38 Davis, Fénelon, p. 84.
39 LTS, p. 174.
40 Dániel Schmal, “The Problem of Conscience and Order in the Amour-Pur Debate,” in 
Gábor Boros, Herman De Dijn, Martin Moors (eds.), The Concept of Love in Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Century Philosophy, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2008, pp. 113-124, 
at pp. 116-117.
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defense of the love of creatures and natural sociability (A Discourse Concerning 
the Love of God, 1696).41
4. Leibniz’ Response to the Controversy: Th e 1697 Letter to Electress Sophie
Th e amour pur controversy had stirred widespread interest and Electress 
Sophie of Hanover, Leibniz’ closest mentor, had heard of it as she was in-
terested in theological matters. No known letter where Sophie asks Leibniz’ 
opinion on the controversy or its topic exists, but Leibniz’ letter to Sophie, 
probably written in the autumn of 1697, clearly indicates that he had received 
such a request either by letter or in person. 
Leibniz fi rst became aware of the debates on disinterested love in mid-May 
1697 when his correspondent, the Scottish cleric and scientist Th omas Burnett 
of Kemney (1654 -1729), mentioned to him the debate between John Norris 
and the then only 20-year-old Mary Astell.42 Soon Leibniz found out about the 
French controversy and he was happy to comment on it with Sophie. 
Leibniz started the letter to the Electress by saying that he had read two 
or three documents about the dispute between the two renowned prelates of 
France, but he prefers to leave the solution of the controversy to the Pope.43 He 
settles for giving his opinion on the matter and trusting it to Sophie’s judgment: 
I will only give here the ideas that I have had before on this subject, some 
of which have not been displeasing to Your Electoral Highness. Of all the 
matters of Th eology there are none about which ladies have more right to 
judge than this one, because it concerns the nature of love. Although to 
form a judgment it is not necessary that they possess the great insights of 
Your Electoral Highness, whose penetration goes almost beyond that of most 
profound authors, I would also not want them to be as Madam Guyon is 
depicted, that is, ignorant devotees. I would want them to resemble Miss de 
Scudéry, who has clarifi ed the characters and the passions very well in her 
41 Catherine Wilson, “Love of God and Love of Creatures: The Masham-Astell Ex-
change,” in Gábor Boros, Herman De Dijn, Martin Moors (eds.), The Concept of Love in 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Philosophy, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2008, 
pp. 141-162, at p. 125. For another account of the correspondence concerning love between 
Astell and Norris, see Jacqueline Broad, Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 100-103, and for Masham’s criticism, 
pp. 119-122. The supporters of religious enthusiasm argued that inspired and involuntary 
human activity directed by divine powers is to be preferred over our deliberate and willful 
conduct. On enthusiasm, see Michael Losonsky, Enlightenment and Action from Descartes 
to Kant: Passionate Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, chap. 5. 
42 GP III, p. 199.
43 LTS, p. 175. According to Strickland, Leibniz probably did not read the two books 
by Fénelon and Bossuet, but instead some responses to them or reviews of the books. LTS, 
p. 175, n. 293.
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novels and in her Conversations about Morals, or at least like the English Lady 
Miss Norris, of whom it has been said that she has recently written so well on 
disinterested love.44
From the context it is clear that by giving his opinion on disinterested love 
Leibniz hopes for the Electress’ response because he values her judgment. Th e 
beginning of the citation above suggests, furthermore, that the two had discussed 
the topic of love before. Th e discussion prompted by Leibniz’ letter might have 
taken place sometime in the autumn of 1697, but no known written evidence 
of such a discussion exists.45 To extend the persuasive character of the letter he 
also provides a list of well-known learned women who have succeeded in voic-
ing their opinions in a reasonable form in contrast to Madam Guyon, who was 
known as a quietist and a mystic. Leibniz was consistently opposed to quietism, 
which stressed the need to go beyond suspending judgment—one was to empty 
one’s mind and await directions from God on all matters.46
Leibniz starts his letter by refl ecting on the theme of the controversy, that 
is, the love of God. He starts by saying that “to love is to fi nd pleasure in the 
perfection or advantages of others and especially in their happiness.”47 He 
mentions beautiful things and intelligent substances, of which Sophie is a 
prime example. Th is (disinterested) love is so strong that all other pleasures 
come second and this concerns especially God whose perfections are supreme. 
44 LTS, pp. 175-176; A I, 14, pp. 54-55; note that Leibniz confuses Mary Astell with 
John Norris, whom he incorrectly refers to as “Miss Norris.”
45 See A I, 14, p. 54. Strickland argues that Leibniz could not have written the letter 
earlier than mid-May 1697 when he became aware of the controversy and it could not have 
been written later than in the spring of 1699 when the controversy ended. He also gives 
more reasons to date the letter to the autumn of 1697 (LTS, p. 174, n. 292). The Academy 
editors suppose that Leibniz sent the letter in mid-August 1697 because Sophie’s daugh-
ter, soon-to-be Queen of Prussia, Sophie Charlotte, was visiting Hanover at the time and 
Leibniz must have thought that she would also see the letter. According to Utermöhlen, 
however, the letter was in fact based on discussions with both Sophie and Sophie Charlotte 
in Hanover: Gerda Utermöhlen, “Die Rolle fürstlicher Frauen im Leben und Wirken von 
Leibniz,” in Hans Poser & Albert Heinekamp (eds.), Leibniz in Berlin, Stuttgart: Steiner, 
1990, pp. 44-60, at p. 51. As the correspondence between Leibniz and Sophie Charlotte 
started in late 1697 and grew more frequent in 1698-1699, I am persuaded by Strickland 
and Utermöhlen that the letter was written in the autumn of 1697. However, no conclusive 
evidence on this exists. 
46 Richard Popkin, “The Religious Background of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy,” 
in Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (eds.), Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century 
Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 393-422, at p. 403. The 
following criticism of quietism by Leibniz in Discours de Métaphysique, §4 (1686) can 
well be extended to Fénelon’s views: “we must not be quietists and stand ridiculously with 
arms folded, awaiting that which God will do […] we must act in accordance with what 
we presume to be the will of God, insofar as we can judge it, trying with all our might to 
contribute to the general good […].” A VI, 4, pp. 1535-1536; L, p. 305.  
47 LTS, p. 176; A I, 14, p. 55.
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Contemplating God’s perfections is loving him and therefore love of God is 
necessarily related to our own good. As in the Elementa, Leibniz argues that 
one can enjoy divine love even if one believes that one is bound to be deprived 
of every other pleasure and even if one believes that one is about to suff er great 
pains.48
Although this may incline one to think that Leibniz is agreeing with Fé-
nelon’s opinion that we can love God without any other rewards, he allows 
only reasonable harm to oneself:
But to suppose that one continues to love God above all things and is never-
theless in eternal torments is to suppose something that will never happen. If 
someone were to make this supposition, he would be in error, and he would 
make it clear that he does not have suffi  cient knowledge of God’s goodness, 
and consequently that he does not yet love him enough.49
Leibniz seems to have regarded Fénelon’s position as a kind of mistrust of 
God’s benevolence and contrary to our natural sense of prudence. In itself, 
this is not surprising, given that he was critical of Descartes’ and Hobbes’ 
voluntarism, arguing that one has to take into account not only God’s power, 
but also his goodness and wisdom.50 Surely God with his supreme goodness 
would not want us to suff er terribly, especially as we love him disinterestedly? 
Th us it is evident that Leibniz preferred Bossuet’s views in the controversy. 
Referring to Fénelon’s book, he continues:
Th e Saints who doubtless would have agreed that God will not damn one who 
loves him above all things, and who have nevertheless said that they would 
love God even if they should have to be damned, intended to mean, by this 
false supposition, that the motives of the love arising from benevolence, or from 
the virtue of charity, are entirely diff erent from the motives of the virtue of 
hope or the love arising from greed (which does not properly deserve the name 
of love).51
Like Fénelon, Leibniz distinguishes between the virtue of char-
ity and the virtue of hope, associating the former with benevolent or dis-
interested love and the latter with mercenary love, a kind of theologi-
cal version of prudence. Th e distinction itself, as Leibniz notes, derives 
from scholasticism (l’amour bienveuillance vs. l’amour de cupidité).52
Unlike in his earlier writings on love, Leibniz presents the concupiscent or 
mercenary love, that is, the virtue of hope, in a favorable light even though 
48 LTS, pp. 176-177; A I, 14, p. 55.
49  LTS, p. 177; A I, 14, p. 56.
50 See M, p. 58.
51 LTS, p. 177¸ A I, 14, p. 56.
52 A I, 14, p. 56.
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he also argues that it does really deserve the name of love. He says that while 
disinterested love only consists in the pleasure which derives from the sight 
of the perfection and happiness of the object loved without considering any 
other good or profi t which we can get from it, self-interested love is permit-
ted, as it consists in the sight of our own good, without consideration for the 
happiness and advantage of others.53 Leibniz’ formulation is similar to the one 
found in Elementa and Codex with the exception that there he never said that 
calculating love is permissible—instead, he argued that it is unjust not to be 
delighted in the good of others when occasion arises.54
Leibniz argues that nothing prevents the actions of the two virtues, of 
charity and hope, from being exercised jointly. Th is is because one does not 
have to make a diff erence between willing God’s goodness for oneself or for 
others.55 Th us, if I exercise the virtue of hope together with the virtue of char-
ity, I hope for salvation not only for myself, but for all men. Th is is a diff erent 
case from wanting it for only myself as would be the case in concupiscent 
love. Th us, Leibniz presents a theological version of his doctrine of love which 
is diff erent from both Fénelon’s and Bossuet’s. While he could not accept 
the indiff erence of Fénelon, his view is also diff erent from Bossuet’s position, 
where the true love of God can only be motivated by one’s desire for personal 
happiness.
Leibniz goes on to say that there is a “grand refl exion” of one of these vir-
tues to another. When we are not content with our present love, we ask God 
for a greater knowledge (connoissance) in order to have more love and thus 
exercise an act of hope where our own good is the primary motivation. But 
when the pleasure we feel arises from God’s perfections and makes us wish 
that this better understanding of God is common to all His creatures, we are 
exercising an act of benevolence. Leibniz argues that a sign of disinterested 
love towards God is to be content with his creation and to submit to his pre-
sumptive will, trusting that our future will be to our own good.56
One can see here an anticipation of the views in Essais de theodicée (1710). 
Trusting in God’s wisdom and goodness will assure us that everything hap-
pens for our own good and this benevolent or disinterested love towards our 
creator will secure our good for us. Leibniz seems to be saying that when the 
virtue of hope is combined with the virtue of charity, we can hope for an in-
crease in perfection with regard to the whole world. Th us, the virtue of charity 
in a sense includes the virtue of hope, but not the other way around. Leibniz 
argues that one of the strongest indications of a love of God which is sincere 
and disinterested is being satisfi ed with what one has already done, in the as-
surance that it is always the best, but also in trying to promote the common 
53 Ibid.
54 A VI, 1, p. 465; K, I, 6, p. 470.
55 A I, 14, p. 57.
56 Ibid. 
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good as found in God’s known will in the past.57 Th us, the virtue of hope can 
be extended to our virtuous actions—our hope for a happy future requires us 
to practice charity or to love the other disinterestedly. Instead of waiting for 
the judgment day, we should strive to promote perfection in this world.  
We have seen that Leibniz’ account of love in his letter is diff erent from 
his earlier writings.58 Unlike in the Codex, he argues that hope and disinter-
ested love are related to each other instead of the latter being independent of 
the former. However, it is clear that although Leibniz says that self-interested 
love can be permitted, he does not allow it without a connection to charity 
or benevolence. It seems that Leibniz is in fact trying to persuade Sophie 
that charity is to be preferred by showing how hope for our own good can be 
understood within the context of practicing benevolence. Th us his account 
of love in the letter is especially tailored for Sophie as a preferable alternative 
to the solutions provided by Fénelon or Bossuet. His eff ort to combine both 
virtues is characteristic in the sense that he often tried to reconcile diff erent 
opinions in order to fi nd a solution which would be acceptable to all parties.
In the second part of the letter, Leibniz off ers his previous, more philosophical 
views. He writes: “I wanted to go further into this matter some years ago, before 
it became stirred up in France.”59 He argues that with the help of the defi nitions 
given in the Codex one can fi nd a non-mercenary type of love which is detached 
from hope and from fear and from all self-interested concerns.60 Leibniz seems to 
be saying that thanks to his philosophical doctrine of disinterested love the dif-
fi cult topic of hope of salvation and fear of punishment can be avoided altogether. 
As disinterested love is an aff ect, a feeling based on pleasure, it does not require 
willing, which is essentially related to the Christian virtues. Th e main diff erence 
between hope as aff ect and hope as virtue seems to be that the aff ect includes its 
own reward, whereas the virtue of hope requires divine justice. 
One may wonder what is the relationship between the fi rst and the second 
part of the letter. If Leibniz is ready to modify, i.e., to theologize, his doctrine 
in the fi rst part, why does he come back to his previous, philosophical views at 
all in the second? It seems to me that by giving both a theological and philo-
sophical account of love he is trying to argue that his previous account can be 
applied to the theological context, and the outcome of both accounts suggests 
that benevolent or disinterested love is the only true form of love. One can 
interpret Leibniz’ eff ort to explain benevolent love as including the Christian 
virtue of hope as an introduction to his earlier views, where the detachment 
57 A I, 14, p. 57.
58 This seems to have escaped the attention of other commentators of Leibniz’ doctrine. 
For example, Riley in his account of the pure love controversy comments only on the latter 
half of Leibniz’ letter to Sophie, where he summarizes his former views. Riley, Leibniz’ 
Universal Jurisprudence, pp. 152-154. 
59 LTS, p. 178; A I, 14, p. 57.
60 LTS, p. 179; A I, 14, p. 58.
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of disinterested love from hope is only apparent, as the doctrine in fact also 
includes a concern for one’s own good when it is understood properly. For 
Leibniz, this is how his own version is superior to both Fénelon’s and Bossuet’s 
accounts—his version of pure love off ers immediate pleasure from our love of 
God. On the other hand, one can also assume that both the theological and 
the philosophical versions of love are helpful. Not everybody can reach the 
virtue and wisdom required and for them charity combined with hope is an 
advantageous way to conduct their lives. 
Leibniz’ careful argumentation refl ects the central role of hope in the con-
troversy. Fénelon held that even salvation or eternal happiness is not desirable 
in the indiff erent state of a pure love of God and he was accused of leaving 
no room for the Christian virtue of hope. In his later writing from Septem-
ber 1697 he insisted that pure love does not hinder us from willing everything 
which God wills that we should will, and that indiff erence is wanting what 
God wants.61 Th is unconditional submitting to God’s will is very diff erent from 
Bossuet’s practical union, where we love God and because of that we can hope 
for salvation. As a perceptive reader and through his contacts Leibniz must have 
been well aware of Fénelon’s problems. Th erefore one can suppose that in So-
phie’s eyes (and in those of the Court of Hanover in general) he wanted to 
distance himself from the quietist doctrine with which his previous account 
might have been confused and instead emphasized the signifi cance of hope. 
Th ere is no known answer by Sophie to Leibniz’ letter. One wonders, however, 
what her motives were in asking for Leibniz’ opinion on the controversy. Was 
she interested in the nature of love as a philosophical problem, as a theological 
problem or just in the controversy itself? Th e answer to this question is unavoid-
ably speculative as no written evidence exists. Judging by Leibniz’ approach, 
which was to start from the controversy and then proceed to his earlier views, it 
seems to me that Sophie was not necessarily interested in the concept or essence 
of disinterested love in itself, but more in the theological controversy which was 
so famous and important that she was keen to hear Leibniz’ opinion about it. 
One objection against this would be to point out Leibniz’ indication at 
the beginning of the letter that Sophie had heard of his views on disinterested 
love before. Th is suggests that the letter was a continuation rather than the 
beginning of a discussion.62 Th is would perhaps also partly explain why Leib-
niz chose to present his views in a more theological style—utilizing the pure 
love controversy, he perhaps tried to introduce his doctrine in an alternative 
manner which would show that his doctrine can be applied to the theological 
61 Adams, “Pure Love,” p. 87; Davis, Fénelon, pp. 84, 86-87.
62 Leibniz also wrote to Sophie on disinterested love on 25 September 1708 when he 
commented on Louis des Ban’s book L’art de connoistre les hommes (1702). Again he 
referred to the Codex and argued that he was writing about the topic before the pure love 
controversy. See LTS, p. 371. 
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problem of the controversy. But as no evidence of their earlier discussions on 
the topic remains, this is also pure speculation.63
5. Leibniz’ Later Views on the Controversy and Disinterested Love
Brown has argued that Leibniz’ views on disinterested love stayed essential-
ly the same after his early Elementa of 1671.64 We saw in the previous section 
that although Leibniz did not exactly change his mind when presenting his 
views to Sophie, he was ready to give them an alternative formulation which 
allowed for a combination of self-interested and disinterested motives. So-
phie’s request for Leibniz’ comment on the pure love controversy was clearly a 
catalyst for the philosopher to rethink about his views in a theological context. 
Th e letter raises a question whether the controversy had a lasting eff ect on 
Leibniz’ views. I will next provide a brief overview of Leibniz’ accounts of love 
and comments on the pure love controversy to show that this is not the case. 
Leibniz commented on the pure love controversy in exchanges with many 
of his numerous correspondents.65 To the learned Abbot Claude Nicaise 
(1623-1701) he sent comments on the controversy both in France and in 
England, especially celebrating Mary Astell’s writings.66 In a self-congratula-
tory manner he wrote that it is reasonable for women to judge matters of love 
as it would lead them to the same conclusion he had already formed in his 
Codex and this would be the end of the dispute.67 Of interest is also the fact 
that Nicaise told Leibniz that he had sent Leibniz’ views on disinterested love 
not only to Fénelon and Bossuet, but also to Mademoiselle de Scudéry, who 
refused to get involved with such an elevated topic.68
63 There are varying opinions on Sophie’s philosophical abilities. For a defense of So-
phie’s philosophical mind (he does not discuss the 1697 letter), see Lloyd Strickland, “The 
Philosophy of Sophie, Electress of Hanover,” Hypatia 24 (2009), pp. 186-204. For criti-
cism, see the review of LTS by Irena Backus, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (29 
July 2011) [accessed on 20 February 2013] http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24775-leibniz-and-the-
two-Sophies-the-philosophical-correspondence/. Backus argues that “there is nothing with-
in the correspondence as reproduced here to suggest that Sophie of Hanover’s philosophical 
ability has so far been underestimated by scholars.” I am inclined to think that the fact that 
disinterested love features several times in the correspondence between Sophie and Leibniz 
suggests that Sophie was interested in the topic at least to some extent. 
64 Brown, “Disinterested Love,” p. 266.
65 For a general account of Leibniz’ discussion on the topic of pure love with his corre-
spondents, see Gaston Grua, La justice humaine selon Leibniz, Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1956, pp. 170-180.
66 Leibniz to Nicaise, 28 May1697. See also GP II, p. 580.
67 GP II, pp. 569-570. Leibniz’ comment is similar to the one made in the letter to So-
phie: a wise person will see that his philosophical doctrine is superior to the views of the 
theologians. 
68 Nicaise to Leibniz, 27 August 1697, G, p. 119, n. 100. Madeleine de Scudéry (1607-
1701) was a well-known French novelist and a close friend of Paul Pellison’s. Leibniz fi rst 
 52 Markku Roinila 
Leibniz gives his judgment of Fénelon’s views in August 1697, saying that 
he thinks the Archbishop means well, but more explication is needed. Th ere-
fore he suspends his judgment on the matter and waits for further specifi ca-
tions. Leibniz’ position is made clearer in a later letter where he says that 
after reading some more texts he has come to see two things: the exactness 
of Bossuet and the innocence of Fénelon. While the former is mistaken in 
his doctrine, the latter suff ers from good faith. While he has sympathy for 
Fénelon, Leibniz cannot be of exactly the same opinion as Bossuet, as his 
own version of disinterested love includes the idea of pleasure arising from 
the other’s happiness.69 He appears to be somewhat disappointed at Bossuet’s 
relentless cruelty towards Fénelon in the controversy, and he approved of the 
papal bull of 1699, which ended the controversy.70
Leibniz also comments on the controversy in his correspondence with An-
dré Morell (1646-1703). He argues, just as in the letter to Nicaise, that if 
Fénelon and Sherlock and Norris in England had been in possession of his 
distinct notions or defi nitions of disinterested love, they would have had no 
need for the dispute.71
Th e pure love controversy also features briefl y in the correspondence be-
tween Leibniz and Malebranche. Th e latter mentions in a letter of 13 Decem-
ber 1698 that he had prepared a treatise on the love of God. Leibniz replies 
that he would be delighted to read the treatise and refers to the defi nitions 
in the Codex. In addition, he argues that divine love, which is the pleasure 
derived from God’s perfections, is superior to all other loves and can give 
sent her an introductory letter in 1697, where he mentions the pure love controversy and 
says that Nicaise had sent his thought to her (A I, 14, p. 748). This was followed by French 
verses in praise of Louis XIV (A I, 14, pp. 749-54) and letters were exchanged for two 
years. Nicaise probably meant by this an appendix to Leibniz’ letter of 9/19 August 1697, 
where he comments in detail on the controversy of amour pur and gives his defi nition of 
disinterested love in full, repeating mostly the arguments in the Codex (GP II, pp. 576-580). 
On p. 578 Leibniz argues (as in Elementa) that in disinterested love the good follows im-
mediately: “Mais il est visible par la notion de l’amour que nous venons de donner, com-
ment nous cherchons en même temps nostre bien pour nous et le bien de l’objet aimé pour 
luy même; lorsque le bien de cet objet est immediatement, dernierement et par luy même 
nostre but, nostre plaisir et nostre bien, comme il arrive à l’egard de toutes les choses qu’on 
souhaite parce qu’elles nous plaisent par elles mêmes, et sont par consequent bonnes de soy, 
quand on n’auroit aucun egard aux consequences; ce sont des fi ns et non pas des moyens.” 
On pp. 578-579 he argues that Fénelon’s position is familiar from the writings of Averroes 
and Johannes Angelus. 
69 Leibniz to Nicaise, 23 December 1698, GP II, p. 584. Leibniz also wrote to Mme De 
Brinon on 15 May 1699 (G, p. 208) that pure love may be independent of our mercenary 
interest, but not of our good.  
70 Letter to Nicaise, 16 June 1699, GP II, p. 587. See also Leibniz’ assessment of Fé-
nelon’s character in GP II, p. 579.
71 Leibniz to Morell, 31 May 1697. In what follows, Leibniz offers his own defi nition 
of disinterested love and relates it to the promotion of general good. A I, 14, pp. 254-255.
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solid or lasting pleasure, unlike other pleasures. Leibniz adds that this should 
be enough to resolve the problem of the controversy and encourages Mal-
ebranche to continue the discussion.72
   Th e topic resurfaces in many of Leibniz’ later writings on ethics and ju-
risprudence, which I have already discussed in the fi rst section of this paper. In 
Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (1704) II, xx, §3-5 he gives a more 
theological version of his disinterested love. He fi rst repeats his defi nition from 
the Codex and then, referring briefl y to the pure love controversy, makes a dis-
tinction between concupiscent and benevolent love (situating Locke’s views in 
the former category). Leibniz argues that benevolent love fi xes our view of the 
pleasure of others as something which produces or rather constitutes our own 
pleasure. He goes on to say: 
For if it did not refl ect back on us somehow we could not care about it, since 
it is impossible (whatever they say) to disengage from a concern for one’s own 
good. Th at is the way to understand “disinterested” or non-mercenary love, if 
we are properly to grasp its nobility and yet not succumb to fantasies about it.73
Th us he argues again on behalf of primary egoistic motivation in his con-
ception of disinterested love. It is noteworthy that although Leibniz presents 
the doctrine in scholastic terms, he does not mention the virtue of hope at all. 
Th e same can be said about Essais de Th eodicée (1710) and his comments on 
Shaftesbury’s Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711), where 
Leibniz is again content to refer to the Codex.74He mentions quietism briefl y 
in the Preface to the Th eodicy, saying that “some Christians have imagined 
that they could be devout without loving their neighbor.”75
Th e overview above shows that Leibniz was happy to comment on the 
controversy with his correspondents until the Pope ended it offi  cially in 1699. 
After that he was content to refer to his own role as an anticipator of the con-
troversy and repeated his views from the Preface to the Codex iuris gentium of 
1693, even within a theological context, despite his earlier attempt to provide 
a modifi ed version in terms of theological virtues to Electress Sophie in 1697. 
72 Leibniz to Malebranche, 13 March 1699, GP I, pp. 356-358.  In a letter of 17 January 
1700 Leibniz reminded Malebranche that he would like to read the treatise and apparently 
he received it, although there are no known comments by Leibniz on the text: André Robi-
net, Malebranche et Leibniz: Relations personelles, Paris: Vrin, 1955, p. 330.
73  Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. and ed. by 
Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 
163¸ A VI, 6, p. 163.
74 Essais de Theodicée, Preface, GP VI, p. 27; §278, GP VI, p. 282; Appendix Remarques 
sur le livre de l’origine du mal, publié depuis peu en Angleterre, GP VI, p. 417; L, p. 630.
75 GP VI, p. 28; Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy. Essays on the Goodness of God, 
the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil, ed. with and introduction by Austin Farrer, 
trans. by E. M. Huggard, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1996, pp. 52-53.
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Th is suggests that Leibniz thought that his doctrine of disinterested love in 
the Codex was complete and superior to any theological doctrines available, 
including his own in the letter to Sophie. 
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